An open letter on labor in U.S. wireless tower construction

— 23 min read · 5,554 words

For Russian-speaking workersОбращение к работникам

The Illegal Labor Machine Building America's Cell Towers — And the Corporations That Know About It

To every carrier executive, every prime contractor, every project manager, and every regulator reading this:

You have a problem. A serious one. And many of you already know exactly what it is.

For the past year a small group of investigators — all of us industry participants — has conducted a methodical investigation into the labor practices of U.S. wireless tower construction. What we found is not a few bad actors cutting corners. It is a systemic, industry-wide infrastructure of illegal employment, tax fraud, safety-certification fraud, wage theft, and worker exploitation — operating openly, at scale, and directly beneath the logos of America's largest telecommunications corporations.

The bulk of what we document here was assembled from a Russian-language Telegram corpus where this workforce organizes its own hiring. That is the documented record. The pattern itself is not contained by language or nationality. A LinkedIn post by Miguel Leyva — a U.S. military veteran being driven out of the same industry by the same dynamic playing out in Spanish-speaking crews — is one proof of concept on the record. If you have seen this pattern in your own corner of the industry, please contact us. The contact channels are at the end of this letter.

Before the history, before the method, here is the test that settles the question.

What the DM Outreach Showed

A Russian-speaking investigator on the team sent direct messages to 27 named recruiters across the major Telegram channels used by this industry. In every conversation he disclosed that he had no SSN, no work authorization, and only an LLC — a shell company any person can register in any state for the cost of a filing fee.

Twenty-three of the 27 recruiters accepted him on that basis. Eighty-five percent of the recruiters tested.

The acceptances came from named operators at named companies, in their own writing, archived. Eduard Mustiatsa at Net By Net Group LLC, asked "I only have an LLC, would that be a problem?": "We have both Crew Lead and Top, we can figure something out". Andrei at Skytech Construction: "Yes, 1099." Alex Smantsar, who operates two registered entities — Avkite Inc. and Valex Plus Inc. — under the same single-operator pattern documented elsewhere in this corpus: "LLC will work 100%, how's your English?" Sultan at UNE Tech Corp named the price differential explicitly — workers with W-2 status are paid $200 a day, the same role with an LLC pays $180. The LLC discount, written down.

Public job postings backed up the private acceptances. Triple Connect's public ad listed, as the work-authorization requirement, the phrase "LLC or SSN, etc." — presenting an LLC as a substitute path to legal work in the United States, which it is not. PAVLODAR LLC listed an LLC as mandatory and the TTT-1 safety certification as desirable. Makhmud's ad was the cleanest of all: "Whoever has experience, write. There's work. Docs not needed, only experience."

These are not paraphrases. They are the substance of documented, timestamped conversations preserved in their entirety. Thirty-four companies are caught accepting or operating this arrangement, in private message or in public ad. The full census is on this site.

How This Investigation Began

We are not journalists by profession. We work in this industry. We started looking into this in early 2025 after two unrelated industry contacts — who do not know each other — separately told a member of the team about the same first-tier subcontractor: TSC Construction.

The first contact described three problems at TSC Construction. He alleged that TSC Construction was bribing someone at Ericsson. He alleged that TSC Construction was using many Russian-speaking crews who lacked work authorization. And he alleged that there had been ICE arrests of Russian-speaking workers connected to TSC Construction projects. We would probably have set the first conversation aside if a second, unrelated contact had not separately raised the same alleged bribery between TSC Construction and someone at Ericsson, weeks later, in a different conversation about a different program. We have not been able to corroborate the bribery allegation through the corpus or through any other source. We present it here only as the originating tip that prompted the rest of the work — what we did corroborate is documented in the sections that follow. The full preserved-but-unproven framing of this and two other corruption allegations is in What Was Alleged But Is Not Proven, later in this letter.

That is where the investigation began.

After those conversations we spent several months asking questions — calling people we knew in the industry, including operators and recruiters at companies owned and run by people from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and other former Soviet states. Eventually a member of the team was added to three Russian-language Telegram groups used by workers and subcontractors in this industry. One of them is large — more than 1,100 members at the time of writing — with continuous traffic about jobs, crews, employment, certifications, and disputes. The other two are smaller, mostly job and subcontracting ads. We preserved a complete archive of the large group, which now runs to roughly 30,000 messages over more than five years.

For the rest of 2025 the investigation moved slowly. We read, collected, and asked questions. At a certain point the team needed help from a Russian speaker with at least some exposure to the industry. The investigator who joined had limited industry experience — enough to have a credible cover story, not enough to be a tower technician — and reviewed the chat traffic alongside the rest of the team.

He found, very quickly, what was on the surface of the corpus: open discussions of labor violations, undocumented hiring, certificate fabrication, wage theft, and the LLC scheme described later in this letter. With his help we developed a simple test. He would direct-message recruiters in the chat as someone looking for telecom work. The cover story was straightforward: lots of experience, no Social Security number, no work authorization, looking for work. He would ask if that was a problem — the test whose result opens this letter.

Method

During the latest phase of the investigation, we devoted over three hundred hours to AI-assisted analysis of the corpus — reconstructing conversation threads, decoding Russian jargon and code-switched text (English written in Cyrillic letters and Russian written in Latin letters), translating quoted material, and surfacing candidate findings from roughly 30,000 messages. To minimize error, four independent AI-assisted analyses were run in parallel and then reconciled into a single dataset. Every finding was then reviewed by a member of the team and anchored to a specific message ID, with the verbatim Russian text and an English translation preserved alongside it for verification. Errors may remain; the substantial majority of the conclusions are accurate.

The thesis the work produced — that this is the operating model of a meaningful share of the U.S. wireless tower-construction supply chain — is documented in the sections that follow.

The Telegram Network

The corpus runs to roughly thirty thousand messages over more than five years. This network functions as the primary labor marketplace for a large segment of the U.S. wireless-tower workforce. Inside it we found, repeatedly:

Workers openly posting: "Looking for tower work, no documents, any state."
Recruiters openly responding: "Crews needed, documents not required."
Companies advertising: "TTT-1, OSHA-30 — if you don't have them, we'll help make them."
Individuals selling fraudulent certifications. MIA Services, a TSC Construction subcontractor, has run a public price list for fabricated certifications since at least April 2025 — "OSHA 30 for $250, OSHA 10 for $100, RFA, Hazcom and other certs from $20 to $30." The ad has been reposted at least fifteen times. A separate operator named Chingiz runs a competing list at lower prices. This is a market.
Workers sharing test-answer files for mandatory safety exams.
Workers describing crossing the U.S.–Mexico border without authorization and entering the tower workforce directly through this network.
A repeated service offering fraudulent residential addresses for the purpose of obtaining state driver's licenses.

This is not a fringe operation. It is the labor backbone of a meaningful share of the U.S. tower-construction supply chain.

When the workers ask to be paid

When workers at the documented subcontractors are not paid — and they are routinely not paid — the response is not a payroll dispute. The response is a threat.

Net By Net Group's owner, Eduard Mustiatsa, on the record about a complaining worker:

"I won't pay anything without a court order. You'll bring your apologies afterward. Pennsylvania police will deal with you. ICE police."

In a separate thread, joking about a different worker, Mustiatsa wrote: "There's an option to deport the guy right now for $5K."

ICE-as-collection-agency is the load-bearing fact here. The undocumented climber is paid in cash, on a 1099 with no W-2, through an LLC the recruiter recommended; if the recruiter then refuses to pay, the worker has no avenue back. He cannot sue. He cannot file a wage claim. He cannot go to the police. The recruiter is paid. The carrier's site is built. The worker walks away with nothing — or, in the case Mustiatsa describes, with a deportation threat hanging over his complaint.

This is the system the documented subcontractor network runs on. It is the documented evidence underneath every named claim in this letter that the LLC scheme is the operating model of a meaningful share of the industry.

The LLC Scheme

The mechanism is elegant in its simplicity and devastating in its consequences.

Federal law requires every employer to verify work authorization through the I-9 process. That obligation applies to employees. It does not apply to independent contractors.

So this is what happens:

A worker arrives in the United States without work authorization.
They are advised — often by the very companies hiring them — to form an LLC.
The LLC obtains an EIN from the IRS. No SSN is required for this.
The worker is now classified as a "1099 independent contractor," paid through the LLC.
No I-9 is filed. No work authorization is verified. No payroll taxes are withheld.

The company gets to say: "We didn't hire an employee. We engaged a contractor." The worker gets to say: "I'm a business owner." And federal employment law is circumvented entirely.

This is not a loophole that a few people stumbled into. It is the operating model. It was described to us. It was confirmed in writing. It is happening across every major carrier's tower program in the country.

A Documented Mechanism: The Price Collapse

The reason this scheme has metastasized is not mysterious. The reverse-auction pricing imposed by the carriers and their prime contractors made every other model unworkable.

In July 2023, Ericsson informed its U.S. field-services workforce that it was closing its self-performing installations group. About 750 employees were affected. Industry coverage at the time attributed the closure to AT&T pricing pressure that made the work unprofitable to perform with W-2 employees. Industry knowledge inside the U.S. wireless field-services community — which we have not seen documented in trade press — held that warehouse assets, equipment, and effective field capacity passed to TSC Construction, which had been Ericsson's primary U.S. subcontractor on that program since 2017.

Inside the corpus, a TSC Construction subcontractor traced the per-site price for a full new-site delivery on AT&T as it dropped over roughly a year: $20,000, then $18,000, then $16,000, then $13,000. A 35 percent reduction. An independent operator, posting in a different group, called it a 40 percent collapse.

$20,000, then $18,000, then $16,000, then $13,000. A 35 percent reduction.
— TSC subcontractor, in writing, public chat

At $13,000 per site, the work cannot be performed lawfully. Not with W-2 climbers. Not with insured 1099 contractors carrying real certifications. Not with the apparatus an actual U.S. employer is required to maintain.

It can be performed, at $13,000 per site, by a subcontractor whose climbers don't have Social Security Numbers, whose certifications were purchased online, whose paychecks come if at all from an LLC that will not exist by the time anyone sues, and who can be threatened with a call to ICE if they ask twice for what they're owed.

That is the workforce the turf vendors got. They did not get it by accident. They priced for it.

This Is Not Just a Russian-Speaking Story

The corpus on this site is in Russian. The pattern is not.

We cannot prove that with the same depth we have for the Russian-speaking network — that would require a parallel corpus in Spanish, in Portuguese, in English-speaking informal-labor networks. But the operators being driven out of the legitimate part of the industry are saying so publicly.

In a recent public LinkedIn post, Miguel Leyva, a U.S. military veteran who has run a tower-construction company for seven years, announced he was being forced out of business. He named the cause directly:

"I run my company for 7 years with honor and pride … this days is getting harder to get a good price per site, the market is flooded with companies from Ecuador Colombia who they do the job for penny so we lost many sites because we don't agree in low pay. for 7 years I run this company with zero accidents or legal issues. it cost money to training all my employees so I have enough of this mentality I'm broken."

He went from five crews to one in a year. He is selling his equipment. He also wrote: "this days if you request payment you get death treats." That sentence — the threat against operators who try to collect what they are owed — is documented in the Russian-language corpus too.

The post is not about a particular nationality. It is about the same dynamic: a legitimate, compliant U.S. operator who pays his workers properly, trains them properly, insures them properly, and refuses to bid below sustainable prices is being driven out of the industry by competitors who win work by undercutting him at prices only achievable through the same kind of schemes documented in this Russian-language corpus. Different language. Different country of origin for the workforce. Same compression on price. Same mechanism.

If you are an operator outside the Russian-speaking network and you have seen the same pattern — in Latin American crews, in domestic informal-labor crews, anywhere — please contact us. The pattern needs documentation in every language it is operating in.

The Safety Question No One Wants to Ask

There is a dimension to this that goes beyond compliance spreadsheets and legal liability. It is the dimension that should keep every carrier executive and every prime contractor awake at night.

Tower climbing is one of the most dangerous jobs in America. Workers operate at extreme heights — 200, 300, 500 feet — on structures that carry live RF radiation and critical telecommunications equipment. The safety-certification system exists because people die when unqualified individuals climb towers.

This investigation found that safety certifications are being:

Sold by individuals advertising paid fabrication services.
Shared through distribution of exam answer keys.
"Made" by companies as a standard part of onboarding — not through legitimate training, but through fraudulent procurement.
Printed by companies that skip the actual training and examination entirely.

This means right now, on the towers carrying U.S. wireless networks, there are individuals working at fatal heights whose safety qualifications exist only on paper. They are installing equipment they were never properly trained to handle. The cert-tracking portals that the prime contractors and tower owners pay for show some of this when the same crews rotate logo to logo under different LLC names; the rest is invisible because the certifications themselves were never legitimately issued.

Before anyone climbs, the safety credential itself is for sale. In the same channels where crews are hired, a competing seller advertises certificates like any other commodity: an OSHA 30 card for $125, a "full package" for $200, "all other certs from $10." One seller spells out the arithmetic — the price is for the paperwork; "the cost does not include buying the certificates themselves." Another offers a "100% guarantee, no prepayment." These are not training providers. They are document mills, and the safety certifications that prime contractors' vendor-management systems check for can be bought, by anyone, for the price of a tank of gas.

A child on the towers

Federal law prohibits operating a tower climber under the age of eighteen on this kind of structure. Artem Kozyrev started climbing cell towers for Net By Net Group at the age of sixteen. He died on Bristol Road in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, in February 2026, in a traffic accident — not a workplace fall. He was seventeen. The cause of death is not the violation. The violation is that NBN was paying a sixteen-year-old to climb cell towers, in defiance of federal law, on a labor model that left no I-9 on file and no individual identity claim attached to the work he was doing. The eulogy NBN's principal posted publicly is the corpus's plain-language confirmation that NBN was operating Artem on towers when federal law forbade it.

An injury the insurance company will never see

The cost of the system is borne in injuries that never reach an insurance file. A community member in the corpus, describing an injury he watched happen on a tower: "A pipe fell on a guy's finger at the tower. Cut it off. They couldn't sew it back on. He didn't go to the insurance company." The reason the worker did not file: he was working "unofficially." New York State workers' compensation for permanent partial loss of a finger commonly reaches several hundred thousand dollars. The worker received zero. That is the standing trade the system makes with every undocumented climber it puts on a tower: take the risk, take the loss, do not complain, do not file.

When the next climber falls — and on a workforce assembled this way, that is when, not if — the paper trail will lead directly back to the prime contractors and carriers who built this system.

The National-Security Dimension

There is one further point that must be put on the record.

The reverse auctions run by AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile, executed by Ericsson, Amentum, MasTec, and others, combined with payment terms that frequently run NET-90 to NET-180, mean that cell sites across the United States are being built by workers without authorization to be in this country, who have daily, hands-on access to routers, baseband units, and the radio-network equipment that carries American voice, data, and emergency-services traffic — including FirstNet and other government communication.

Open access to the equipment is open access to the network. No one has vetted who these workers are, where they came from, or who they answer to.

It is no longer only cell sites. The same labor model has moved into data-center construction — the physical plant of the cloud and of the AI build-out, and increasingly the target of federal and state security scrutiny. The pattern is identical: subcontractors hiring through LLCs, workers without verified authorization, on sites that house the compute and the network cores of critical infrastructure. One operator, brushing aside a peer's concern about data-center work, put it in his own words — it "saved the lives of many immigrants; if not for it, people would have gone home." Read in context, that suggests a workforce kept in the country by this work because it lacks the authorization to be hired any other way — now building the buildings that hold the nation's data.

Several of the same prime contractors documented in this letter are U.S. government and military contractors. Their other programs — including federal data centers and other infrastructure regulated under federal compliance frameworks — are subcontracted under similar terms to similar networks of vendors. The detail and the documentation belong in a follow-up letter; we are flagging the pattern here so the carriers and primes named above understand that the labor model documented in U.S. wireless tower construction is not the only program this concerns.

Who Knows, Who Participates, and Who Profits

These are the names. The time for euphemisms is over.

Companies that know what is happening

Ericsson. Amentum. MasTec. Nokia.

These are the prime turf vendors whose supply chains the documented subcontractors are operating in. Since the beginning of 2025 we have spoken with people across the industry at every level — lower-level construction managers, project managers, and senior management at companies and vendors connected to Ericsson, Amentum, MasTec, Nokia, American Tower, and SBA. After hundreds of those conversations, the conclusion is unambiguous:

You know.

You know the subcontractors beneath you are employing workers without authorization. You know the multi-tier subcontracting structure you have built — and that you profit from — creates the deliberate opacity that makes this possible.

Under federal law, a company that knowingly engages contractors employing unauthorized workers can face civil and criminal penalties. Knowingly does not require that you personally checked someone's documents. It means you were aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that unauthorized employment was occurring — and you continued the business relationship anyway.

You have large compliance departments. You have vendor management programs. You have safety audits and site inspections. You have cert-tracking portals — your own or third-party — and you have field staff who fill out daily reports.

How does an Amentum, MasTec, or Ericsson safety or compliance department not notice when the same three-person crew works on one site under certifications from Company X today, appears tomorrow on another site under certifications from Company Y, and returns next week under Company X again? The truck is the same. The faces are the same. The company names on the paperwork have changed. This is visible inside your own portals and inside your own field staff's daily reports. It has been visible for years.

We do not believe the silence is an accident. We believe it is a choice.

Companies that participate — knowingly or unknowingly

American Tower. SBA Communications. Crown Castle. Three of the largest tower owners in the United States. Their leverage on this workforce runs through site-access controls, lease conditions, and the safety-cert audits they require of crews working on their structures. They are also turf vendors in their own right for T-Mobile, Verizon, and other carriers — running their own carrier-aligned construction programs and subcontracting that work to the same documented crews this letter has been about. Both of those roles bear on the labor practices documented here.

Betacom. Centerline. Infra Services. Three carrier-aligned installation primes — they take carrier construction work directly and subcontract it down to the documented crews. They are upstream of the same labor pool, drawing from it under the same compressed pricing.

The crews dispatched by all six climb their towers, bolt equipment to their steel, and run cable through their infrastructure every single day.

Whether these companies are aware of the labor practices on their assets is a question they need to answer. The evidence is not hidden. It is operating in plain sight — in a Telegram group with more than a thousand members, in job postings that explicitly state documents are not required, in cert-portal records that show the same workers cycling under different LLC names. Ignorance, at this point, is not a defense. It is a choice not to look.

Direct address

Notice to Carriers

This investigation is not a call to stop construction. It is a call to do the work it has named.

The companies named in the previous sections are exactly the companies that need to act. Not because they are uniquely culpable — though some are — but because they are the ones who have the leverage to clean the supply chain. The carriers, primes, OEMs, tower owners, and turf vendors documented above run the contracts and the cert-tracking portals and the vendor-management programs that already see the documented patterns. The ask is for them to use those tools.

A blanket construction halt would punish the wrong companies. The law-abiding contractors who still carry proper insurance, maintain payroll, document their workers, and follow safety rules are already struggling to survive. If carriers freeze work across the board, those companies may be destroyed first.

That would not solve the problem. It would make the industry even more dependent on the questionable subcontracting networks described in this investigation.

The right response is targeted enforcement, not blanket shutdowns.

Carriers should continue construction through verified, compliant contractors while reviewing subcontractor chains, crew documentation, payroll practices, insurance, safety certifications, worker authorization, and repeated crew movement between company names.

Do not stop the work. Clean the supply chain. Protect the compliant contractors. Remove the companies that are exploiting workers and undercutting the industry.

What Was Alleged But Is Not Proven

We want to be clear about the limits of our evidence — and about why we are surfacing names we initially intended to withhold.

Initially we did not intend to disclose company names or individuals connected to bribery allegations. We wanted to document the broader industry problem without turning the investigation into a list of personal accusations. After compiling a substantial body of data revealing widespread, documented violations across the rest of the supply chain, we changed our position. The companies and turf vendors responsible for managing these subcontractor networks need to clean up their own supply chains, and the originating allegations that put us on this trail are part of why we are asking. Naming them is not personal retaliation; it is part of putting the responsible primes on notice that the structural pattern these allegations sit on top of is the one documented in the rest of this letter.

Three separate corruption allegations sit alongside the documented evidence in this investigation. All three remain ALLEGED. None is proven by the corpus on this site. We are surfacing them because they were either the originating tips of this investigation or arrived during it, and because the structural patterns they describe are consistent with what the rest of the documented evidence shows.

TSC Construction ↔ Ericsson. Two unrelated industry contacts told members of the team, separately, in early 2025 that a senior decision-maker at Ericsson — the turf vendor responsible for AT&T's largest current radio-network rollout — had been placed on the payroll of one of Ericsson's own U.S. subcontractors, TSC Construction. The first contact also alleged that TSC Construction was using many Russian-speaking crews without work authorization, and that there had been ICE arrests of Russian-speaking workers connected to TSC Construction projects. The Russian-speaking-crews allegation is corroborated extensively by the corpus. The bribery allegation is not.
4Tech ↔ Amentum. A community-level admission in the corpus alleges that an Amentum project manager identified only as Kristina or Tina is on the payroll of 4Tech, the subcontractor that has been receiving Amentum's (formerly Jacobs') Pennsylvania AT&T work allocation. The corpus passage — "all the Jacobs work in PA goes to 4tech, they're privileged with them", followed by "because the owner of 4tech services them well" — is the only basis for the claim. No off-corpus source has independently corroborated the underlying transfer.
UTT Group / Sparta Telecom ↔ MasTec. A written account from a former participant alleges that the operator behind UTT Group LLC and Sparta Telecom LLC — a North Carolina subcontractor working for MasTec — has placed a network of MasTec personnel on his payroll: a Program Manager (Lee T), a former Project Manager (William S), his successor PM (Adam F), and two construction managers (Harold C and Taylor S). The same source alleges in-kind compensation including the construction of a residential pool for one of those PMs.

A federal inspector general, the DOL Wage and Hour Division, a properly resourced state attorney general, or a federal grand jury with subpoena power could verify or rule out any of these allegations in a matter of weeks. None of the three has been proven by the corpus on this site. We are not asserting any of them as fact. We are preserving them on the record because of the pattern they sit on top of.

A Call for Information

We know we are not the only people who have seen this. We know there are people inside these companies — workers, managers, safety officers, accountants — who have witnessed these practices firsthand and have stayed silent because they feared retaliation, deportation, or simply did not know who to tell.

We are asking you to come forward.

If you have information about:

Companies hiring workers without authorization
Fabrication or sale of safety certifications (OSHA, TTT, Competent Climber/Rigger)
Wage theft or non-payment of workers
Cash payments designed to evade taxes
Insurance fraud or absence of workers'-compensation coverage
Unsafe practices on tower sites
Repeated crew movement between LLCs
Relationships between contractor management and prime-contractor personnel that may constitute corruption or bid-rigging

Reach out. Email shadowzone2026@pm.me. Telegram t.me/shadowzone2026. Your identity will be protected. We are not a government agency. We are not law enforcement. We are a small group of industry participants who believe this has gone on long enough. Every piece of information you share will be treated with the confidentiality it deserves. You do not need to identify yourself. You do not need to provide your name, company, or position. Just tell us what you know.

This call is not limited to the Russian-speaking network. If you are an operator, a worker, a recruiter, or an insider in a Spanish-speaking, Portuguese-speaking, or English-speaking part of the industry and you have seen the same pattern — please contact us. The Russian-language corpus is what is documented on this site. The pattern itself is wider, and the wider it is documented, the harder it becomes for anyone to pretend it isn't happening.

A Note on What This Is — and What It Isn't

We want to be clear about our intentions.

This is not an attack on any nationality or language group. Our concern is not directed at where people come from but at what companies choose to do. Many Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Latin American, and U.S.-born contractors are skilled, hardworking professionals who entered the industry legitimately, demand proper documentation from their workers, and operate in full compliance with the law. This investigation confirmed that explicitly: a minority of operators — documented on this site as the compliance-positive counterexamples — either refused to engage without proper work authorization or publicly require it. Those companies are doing the right thing, and they deserve respect. Several of them are documented on this site as the compliance-positive counterexamples.

The problem is not the workers. The problem is the system — a system designed by contractors and tolerated by prime contractors, turf vendors, and carriers, that exploits vulnerable people for profit while undermining the law, evading taxes, and endangering lives.

This is not about immigration politics. We have no interest in the broader debate about border policy. Our concern is narrow and specific: the laws that exist today are being violated, systematically, by companies that profit from it, at the expense of workers who are exploited by it, and at the risk of public safety.

This is not a threat. It is a disclosure. The evidence exists. The patterns are documented. The question now is whether the industry will address it — or whether regulators, carriers, and the public will have to do it for them.

This letter is issued anonymously to protect the safety of the team and the individuals who contributed to this investigation. The team is prepared to provide the full evidentiary record to appropriate parties upon request.

For tips, information, or correction requests: Email: shadowzone2026@pm.me Telegram: t.me/shadowzone2026

Обращение к работникам / Appeal to Workers

Если вы работаете или работали на вышках сотовой связи в США — это обращение к вам.

Если вас кинули на деньги — не заплатили зарплату, задержали выплаты, заставили работать бесплатно — сообщите мне.

Если вас заставляли работать без страховки, без касок, без привязи, или на сайтах где не соблюдалась техника безопасности — сообщите мне.

Если вам продали или «сделали» сертификаты OSHA, TTT-1 или Competent Climber/Rigger без прохождения реального обучения — сообщите мне.

Если вы знаете о компаниях, которые нанимают людей без документов, платят кэшем, уклоняются от налогов, или используют LLC схему чтобы обойти закон — сообщите мне.

Если ваш работодатель угрожал вам депортацией, увольнением или другими последствиями за то, что вы задавали вопросы — сообщите мне.

Ваше имя не будет раскрыто. Ваша личность будет защищена.

Вам не нужно называть себя. Вам не нужно указывать компанию. Просто расскажите, что вы видели и что с вами произошло.

Вы не одиноки. Многие из вас терпели эти условия, потому что боялись. Многие молчали, потому что не знали, кому рассказать. Теперь есть кому.

Связаться со мной: Email: shadowzone2026@pm.me Telegram: t.me/shadowzone2026

Каждый голос имеет значение. Чем больше людей расскажет правду, тем сложнее будет делать вид, что ничего не происходит.